U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Presentation by

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To the members of the Belgian and Dutch Parliaments
Tuesday, March 1, 2005

Overview

U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe

A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning




Prepared by Hans M. Kristensen

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- Background
- Current deployment
- Nuclear logistics
- Base profiles
- The mission
- Burden-sharing
- Conclusions

Note: Documents and images shown in this briefing are available on-line at http://www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/nato.htm



- Roughly 480 bombs
- Widespread deployment to 8 bases in 6 countries
- Four other bases in caretaker status
- Five non-nuclear countries assigned nuclear strike mission


U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2005

| Country | Base | Weapons (B61) | | |
|----------------|------------------|---------------|-------------|-------|
| | | US | Host | Total |
| Belgium | Kleine Brogel AB | 0 | 20 | 20 |
| Germany | Büchel AB | 0 | 20 | 20 |
| 67% | Nörvenich AB | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Ramstein AB | 90★ | 40 ★ | 130★ |
| Italy | Aviano AB | 50 | 0 | 50 |
| 5 | Ghedi Torre AB | 0 | 40 | 40 |
| Netherlands | Volkel AB | 0 | 20 | 20 |
| Turkey | Akinci AB | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Balikesir AB | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Incirlik AB | 50 | 40 | 90 |
| United Kingdom | RAF Lakenheath | 110 | 0 | 110 |
| Total | | 300 | 180 | 480 |


[★] Forty bombs at Ramstein from Memmingen and Araxos may have been returned to the United States.



- B61-3/4/10 mods
- All weapons were modernized in 1998-2003: surety and employment
- New trainer (B61-4
 Type 3E) deployed
 from December 2001



Weapons Storage and Security System (WS3)




Weapons Storage and Security System (WS3)

| Country | Base | wsv | Max. Capacity |
|----------------------|---------------------------|-----|------------------|
| Belgium | Kleine Brogel AB | 11 | 44 |
| Germany ^a | Büchel AB | 11 | 44 |
| | Nörvenich AB ^b | 11 | 44 |
| | Ramstein AB | 55° | 220 |
| Greece | Araxos AB ^b | 6 | 24 |
| Italy | Aviano AB | 18 | 72 |
| | Ghedi Torre AB | 11 | 44 |
| Netherlands | Volkel AB | 11 | 44 |
| Turkey | Akinci AB ^b | 6 | 24 |
| | Balikesir AB ^b | 6 | 24 |
| | Incirlik AB | 25 | 100 |
| United Kingdom | RAF Lakenheath | 33 | 132 |
| Total | | 204 | 816 |


^a The German air base at Memmingen was closed in 2003.

b The vaults at these bases are in caretaker status with no weapons.

^c One of these is thought to be a training vault.



- Location of Weapons Storage Vaults in Protective Aircraft Shelters (PAS)
- USAF shows two shelter configurations
- Satellite images show mainly two shelter sizes:
 - ~ 37.5 x 23 m
 - ~ 31.5 x 17 m



Weapons Maintenance Truck (WMT)



WMT at Kleine Brogel AB.

- 14 trucks
- Provide on-site maintenance and repair to B61 bombs
- Established in 1991 as part of the Regionalized Nuclear Weapons **Maintenance Concept** (RNWMC)

Nuclear logistics: WMT




B61 bomb is partially disassembled inside WMT or next to it inside PAS

 WMT visit PAS to perform weapons maintenance and repair inside shelter



Nuclear logistics: WMT



April 1997: USAF safety review of F-15 and F-16 DCA found:


"It cannot be assured that the B61 meets military characteristics (MC) requirements in abnormal environments when the electrical regions are breached and the nuclear systems remain functional. Under these conditions, nuclear detonation may occur if energy capable of initiating the nuclear system is present."

WS3 modernization currently underway



WS3 Modification Schedule






- \$10 million modernization to be completed in 2005
- WS3 sustainment through FY2018
- \$2 million contract in 2004 to upgrade monitoring and console equipment at 12 locations

Base profiles: Volkel AB



- 20 B61 bombs for use by Dutch F-16
- U.S. Air Force custodian:703 MUNSS
- ~32 PAS
- 11 weapons storage vaults
- Max capacity:44 weapons

Base profiles: Kleine Brogel AB



- 20 B61 bombs for use by Belgian F-16
- U.S. Air Force custodian:701 MUNSS
- 26 PAS
- 11 weapons storage vaults
- Max capacity:44 weapons

Base profiles: Kleine Brogel AB close-up



Former alert weapons storage area



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Base profiles: Kleine Brogel AB close-up



Rumored main nuclear weapons storage area today



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The mission

Three main reason used for retaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe:

- Russia could turn bad and still has a lot of nonstrategic nuclear weapons
- Symbol of continued U.S. commitment to NATO: provides trans-Atlantic glue
- Other countries on NATO's southern periphery are developing weapons of mass destruction

The mission: Russia

USCINCEUR (December 1997) on nuclear aircraft readiness requirements:

"Russian tactical nuclear weapons and the doctrine to employ them remain a threat to NATO."

"Russia maintains at least a 3 to 1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons as compared to the U.S. and a vastly greater advantage over NATO."

"The Russians enjoy a near 40 to 1 advantage in delivery systems."

"Significantly, Russian tactics have evolved to lean more heavily than before on tactical nuclear weapons as their conventional force effectiveness has declined."

The mission: Institutional glue

The 1999 Strategic Concept:

"Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the alliance."

The 2001 NPG Final Communiqué:

"We emphasize again that nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO continue to provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the alliance."

The mission: Proliferators

USCINCEUR (December 1997) on nuclear aircraft readiness requirements:

"The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by states within the EUCOM AOR/AOI and their ability to target the capitals of Europe is of growing concern."

The mission: Proliferators

Arrangements for use of EUCOM aircraft and weapons outside EUCOM were made in 1994:



MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: NSNF Working Group Meeting Minutes

29 Mar 94

- (U) JSCP Annex C guidance governing the theater CINC's requirements when requesting preplanned targeting outside their own AOR is necessary. Action: Provide draft guidance for inclusion into Change 4 to JSCP Annex C. OPR: J513, CDR Due: 4 Apr 94.


10 May 94

(7) (U) It was agreed that centralized PAL management discussed in the Theater Nuclear support model could be implemented in the short-term with the exchange of PAL materials between STRATCOM and EUCOM (for missions not executed from CINCEUR's AOR using CINCEUR delivery platforms/weapons).

Partially declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act.


EUCOM now supports CENTCOM nuclear mission (Iran/Syria).

The mission




1990s: EUCOM area of responsibility

2001-: EUCOM area of responsibility now includes all of Russia



The mission



Range of fighter bombers:

- With 1390 km unrefueled combat range, PA-200
 Tornado from Büchel can reach into Belarus. F-16s from Volkel and Kleine
 Brogel about same range (double range for illustration)
- With 1370 unrefueled combat range with two bombs, F-16 from Incirlik can reach into Iran and southern Russia

The end of burden-sharing?



- Quiet removal of nuclear weapons from Greece in 2001
- Contradicts 1999 Strategic Concept and numerous NPG statements
- Suggests that host nations can withdraw from nuclear burdensharing with no negative consequences to NATO's ability to deter or alliance unity
- Greece withdrawal follows Canada in 1984; now Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Turkey can follow

The problems with continued deployment

- Perpetuates Cold War hostile relationship between Russia and NATO/United States
- Prevents progress on addressing non-strategic nuclear weapons issue
- Undercuts U.S./European efforts to persuade Iran to abandon nuclear weapons by creating double standard
- Inconsistent with articles I, II, and VI of the NPT
- Contradicts "additional steps" from 2000 NPT review conference and 2004 U.N. resolution 59-76 to reduce nonstrategic nuclear weapons
- It is unnecessary: nuclear bombs can be delivered from the U.S. or redeployed to Europe in a crisis and do not need to be forward deployed

Perspectives and priorities

- Cold War ended 15 years ago
- NATO focus is nonproliferation, peacekeeping, and transforming to "new" security alliance. Nuclear deterrence is not a priority
- Russia is supposed to be a partner
- Russian tactical nuclear weapons must be brought under control and transparency increased
- Iran and others are to be persuaded not to develop nuclear weapons
- The NPT regime is essential and must be strengthened
- Forward-deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe is "old NATO"