

By: Col Rhoades

Working Group 5

MEETING SPECIFICS: 17 Nov 93, 1300-1600, Room 1D-883

ATTENDEES: Guest - Ms Lisa Bronson, OSD (Negotiation/Implementation)

MEETING AGENDA/OBJECTIVES:

- Info on bio/chemical programs.
- Discuss question of "How do US nuclear weapons and their posture impact proliferation?"
- Review steering group comments. Briefing at Tab 1.

MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS:

- Ms Bronson:

-- Biological weapons do not belong in same model as chemical.

--- Hundreds of tons for chemical vs 10-100 kilograms for biological.

--- Biological use is very hard to detect if not on massive scale. Always question of proof, especially if retaliation (nuclear) is planned. "No smoking gun."

--- Dual-use activities.

- cosmetics
- agricultural
- food processing
- drug industry

--- Bio/chem accelerating; possessor doubled in last 10 years. Problem worse since FSU break up. Like nuclear arena, technical experts are for sale.

-- Written sources for doctrine/use very limited except for FSU. Clearly developing capability without developed concept for employment.

-- Proliferants will probably not stockpile biological weapons, produce as needed to prevent detection.

- Col Shanahan (J-5 WTC) asked why a proliferant might not use biological weapon if they are so hard to detect or prove use.

-- Ms Bronson cited two reasons: own uncertainty over control of release and possible world condemnation if discovered. Although she noted that there is no record of world condemnation for chemical use.

- Dr Altfeld (N-51) asked if it would be possible to make vaccines for "designer bugs." Ms Bronson stated that currently it takes 14 years to get vaccine into the field, so near-term solutions rested with defensive gear. Also massive doses of agents would likely exceed vaccine's effects.

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- Mr Stephens indicated that steering group thought groups were about where they expected. Wanted this group to ensure it explores relationship between deterrence, use of WMDs, security assurances, CTB, free zones. Also steering group is trying to get on SECDEF calendar this weekend.

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SIGNIFICANT OUTCOMES: None.

OTHER: None

Tab 1  
Working Group 5 Brief to Steering Group (S)

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