NUCLEAR SUPPLEMENT TO JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN
FOR FY 1996 (JSCP FY 96)

   (NUWEP 92) (U)
   b. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (CJCSI 3110.01) (U)
   c. DNA Report 3376F, "Nuclear Weapon Employment
      Constraints for the Control of Fallout (U)"
   d. CJCSI 5119.01, "Charter for Centralized Direction,
      Management, Operation, and Technical Support of the Nuclear
      Command, Control, and Communications System (U)"

1. (U) Purpose. As directed by references a and b, this instruction
   provides guidance to the CINCs and Chiefs of the Services for preparing
   and coordinating plans to deploy and employ nuclear weapons.
   Additional guidance developed by the CINCs and Services and the
   resulting plans and procedures must comply with the guidance in this
   supplement.

2. (U) Cancellation. MCM-148-91, "Annex C (Nuclear) to the Joint
   Strategic Capabilities Plan CY 1993-1995," Change 5, 1 August 1995, is
   canceled. Destroy canceled document in accordance with existing
   security directives. Certificates of destruction need not be sent to the
   Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. (U) Applicability. This instruction applies to the CINC, Services,
   Defense agencies, and Joint Staff.

Classified by: LTG Wesley K. Clark, DJ-5
Reason: 1.5(a)
Declassify on: X-4
4. (U) **Policy.** Guidance provided here will be followed for the development or implementation of plans in accordance with reference b.

5. (U) **Responsibilities.** See Enclosure H.

6. (U) **Definitions.** See Enclosure I.

7. (U) **Summary of Changes**
   a. (S) 
   b. (S) 
   c. (S) 
      (1) (S)  
      (2) (S)  
   d. (S)  

8. (U) **Effective Dates.** CJCSI 3110.04 is effective for planning upon receipt. It applies to plans effective on or after 1 October 1996.

9. (U) **Document Security.** This cover letter is classified SECRET. Enclosures are classified as marked.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:


WALTER KROSS  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director, Joint Staff

Enclosures:  
A--General  
B--Weapon Deployment and Security
C--General Employment Planning Guidance
D--SIOP and NRF Employment Planning
E--Theater Nuclear Planning
F--Reconnaissance in Support of Nuclear Operations
G--SIOP and NRF Review, Approval, and Analysis
H--Responsibilities
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ENCLOSURE A
GENERAL (U)

1. (U) **Purpose.** This supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP FY-96) provides Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance to the CINC's and Chiefs of the Services for preparing and coordinating plans to deploy and employ nuclear weapons. Additional guidance developed by the CINC's and Services and the resulting plans and procedures must comply with the guidance in this supplement.

2. (U) **Scope**
   a. (U) This supplement encompasses all nuclear weapon associated tasks assigned by the basic JSCP. It applies to the employment of all current and near-term nuclear forces and to the preparation of all US plans involving nuclear operations.
   b. (U) Nuclear weapon allocation and deployment authorizations are published separately.
   c. (U) Unless otherwise directed, plans for the employment of nuclear weapons will be submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

3. **FOCUS** (p. vii)

98-52h

Obtained Under the Freedom of Information Act
by Hans M. Kristensen

Classified by: LTG Wesley K. Clark, DJ-5
Reason: 1.5(a)
Declassify on: X-4

Enclosure A
4. (U) Basic Employment Objectives

a. (U) The fundamental objective of US nuclear employment policy is to deter direct attack, particularly nuclear attack, on the United States and its allies. Deterrence is best achieved if US defense posture makes a Russian assessment of war outcomes, under any contingency, so uncertain and dangerous that it removes any incentive for initiating attack.

b. (S) [...

c. (S) [...

d. (S) [...

5. (U) Required US Capabilities

a. (S) [...

b. (U) US employment flexibility must provide the capability for responding effectively and appropriately to any situation in which nuclear weapons may need to be employed to achieve US objectives.
6. (S) FORCE READINESS PLANNING (p. VII)
ENCLOSURE B
WEAPON DEPLOYMENT AND SECURITY (U)

1. (U) Deployment Concept
   a. (S) Confidential

   Obtained Under the Freedom of Information Act
   by Hans M. Kristensen

   (b)(6)

2. (U) NSNF Deployment and Reconstitution
   a. (U) The Chiefs of the Services and CINCs will maintain NSNF deployment and reconstitution capabilities as follows:
      (1) (S) Confidential

      (b)(6)

      (2) (S) Confidential

      (b)(6)

   b. (U) Theater CINC, in coordination with the Services, USACOM, and USSTRATCOM, will develop and forward to the Chairman of the Joint

Classified by: LTG Wesley K. Clark, DJ-5
Reason: 1.5(a)
Declassify on: X-4

Enclosure B
Chiefs of Staff for review and approval, their plans for NSNF deployment/employment in accordance with Enclosure E of this supplement.

3. (U) **Weapon Security.** Each CINC and Service has responsibility for the storage and security of nuclear weapons deployed under their jurisdiction.
   a. 
   b. 
   c. 

---

Enclosure B
d. (U) The welfare and safety of hostages will be considered in determining the actions to be taken for the protection or destruction of US nuclear weapons. However, the presence of hostages will not deter the taking of decisive, prompt, and effective action, including the use of deadly force to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon.

e. {S} \[ \text{J} \]

f. {S} \[ \text{J} \]
ENCLOSURE C

GENERAL EMPLOYMENT PLANNING GUIDANCE (U)

1. (U) Scope. This section provides general planning guidance. Specific
guidance for SIOP and NRF employment planning is contained in Enclosure D
and for theater planning in Enclosure E.

2. (U) General. The fundamental objective for the employment of nuclear
weapons is to deter direct attack—particularly nuclear attack—on the United
States or its allies. Additionally, US nuclear weapons could deter the use of
weapons of mass destruction and prevent or respond to aggression against
the US and its allies. To fulfill this purpose:
   a. [Redacted]
   b. (U)

3. [Redacted] Planning Coordination (p. viii)
   a. [Redacted]
   b. [Redacted]
   c. [Redacted]
d. (8)

4. **Planning Factors (P. vii)**

   a. (U) USSTRATCOM is the executive agent for planning factors. USSTRATCOM will review nuclear planning factors provided by the Services (i.e., PLS, weapon system reliability, and accuracy factors for each nuclear designated weapon system) along with supporting methodology and rationale. Once reviewed, these planning factors can be used for planning the SIOP. For greater fidelity of theater nuclear option analysis, these planning factors may be used as the basis of initial option planning and revised as planning values and employment tactics become more refined. Reporting and analysis will be accomplished in accordance with USSTRATCOM Pre-Launch Survivability and Strategic Missile Operational Testing Guidelines. Copies of all reports will be provided to the Joint Staff and Services.

   b. (U) The Joint Staff will provide USSTRATCOM with communication system reliability planning factors.

   c. (U) Nuclear weapon system penetration capabilities will be determined by using programs developed by, or under the guidance of, USSTRATCOM in coordination with affected CINCs, Services, and the Director, DIA, as appropriate.

   d. (U) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will review and approve all nuclear planning factors in conjunction with the USSTRATCOM Revision Report.

5. (U) **Nuclear Execution**

   a. (8)

   b. (U) **Combatant CINC Actions Upon Nuclear Execution**

   (1) (FS)

C-2

Enclosure C
6. **NUCLEAR TERMINATION**

a. 

b. 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

C-3

Enclosure C
(5) \[ \text{First} \]

7. \[ \text{ESCALATION CONTROL (p. vii)} \]

a. \[ \text{First} \]

b. \[ \text{Second} \]

c. \[ \text{Third} \]

8. \(\text{(U) Constraints}\)
   a. \[ \text{First} \]

   (1) \[ \text{First} \]
Table C-1. (U) Global Monitor Points

c. (U) Prohibited Targets. Certain target categories are prohibited from attack in specific options.

1. (FS) \\
   (a) (FS) \\

2. (FS) \\
   (b) (FS) \\

   (b) (1) 

   (a) (1) 

   (b) (1)
(3) [FS]* 

d. [FS] 

(1) [FS] 

(2) [FS] 

(3) [FS] 

(4) [FS] 

(5) [FS] 

9. [FS]_RELOCATABLE TARGETS (p. vii)

a. [FS] 

b. [FS] 

c. [FS] 

10. (U) Exceeding Limitations. Any deviations from the limitations provided in this supplement must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Notify the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the Joint Staff, immediately if this guidance criteria is exceeded or when military effectiveness is degraded.
Enclosure D
SIOP AND NRF EMPLOYMENT PLANNING (U)

PART I. SIOP PLANNING (U)

1. (S) [SCOPE

   a. (TS)

   b. (TS)

   c. (U) **Focus.** MAOs and LAOs will allow the NCA to:
      (1) (TS)
      (2) (TS)

   [Handwritten note: "98-534, released under the Freedom of Information Act by Hans M. Kristensen"]

   [Redacted text]

   [Redacted text]

   [Redacted text]

   Classified by: LTG Wesley K. Clark, DJ-5
   Reason: 1.5(a)
   Declassify on: X-4
4. **(U) Target Development**
   a. **(U) Target categories that must be attacked to achieve SIOP objectives include:**
      
      (1) {G} \[ \]
      
      (2) {S} \[ \]
   
   b. \[ \]

5. **(U) Target Lists.** USCINCSSTRAT and appropriate CINCss will develop target lists from the TDI or similarly formatted DIA target-intelligence products.
   
   a. **(U) National Target Base (NTB)**
      
      (1) {G} \[ \]
      
      (2) **(U) NTB Target Selection Guidance**
         
         (a) **(U) Strategic Nuclear Forces**
(c) **Leadership and Supporting C³I**

1. **Installations housing:**
   a. 
   b. 
   c. 
   d. 

2. **Critical nodes or key elements of:**
   a. 
   b. 
   c. 
   d. 

(d) 

1. 
   a. 
   b. 
   c. 
   d. 
   e. 

**Enclosure D**
2. (U) Critical nodes or key elements of the:
   a. (TS)
   b. (TS)

3. (TS)

4. (S)
   a. (TS)
   b. (TS)

(3) (U) NTB selection criteria will be specified in documentation supporting NTB production.

6. (U) Selection and Damage Level Guidance
   a. (TS)

Enclosure D
7. (FS)  
   [MAO Structure (p. vii)]
   
   a. (FS)  
   [ ]
   (1) (FS) [ ]
   (2) (FS) [ ]
   b. (FS) [ ]
(1) [TS]
(2) [TS]
(3) [TS]
(4) [TS]
(5) [TS]
d. [TS]

(1) [TS]
(2) [TS]
(3) [TS]
(4) [TS]

8. (U) MAO Targeting Guidance
   a. [TS]
      (1) [TS]
      (2) [TS]
9. (U) **MAO Planning Guidance**
   a. (U) **Force Readiness, Survivability, and Timing.** USSTRATCOM will:
      1. (FS) [ ]

---

Enclosure D
Figure D-2. (U) SIOP Timing Plans
(5) (U) Use the following assumptions in planning MAOs:
   (a) (S)
   (b) (S)
   (c) (S)
   (d) (S)
   (e) (S)
   (f) (TS)
   (g) (FS)
   (h) (TS)
   (I) (S)

b. (U) Weapons Allocation
   (1) (FS)

   (2) (FS)

D-16
Enclosure D
TOP SECRET

(d) (U) In addition to the priorities listed above, allocate SIOP weapons as follows:

1. (TS)
2. (TS)
3. (TS)
4. (TS)
5. (TS)
6. (TS)

(b)(1)

D-18

Enclosure D
c. (U) **Defense Suppression Planning**
   (1)  
   (2)  
   (3)  
   (4)  

d.  

e. (U) **Measures of Effectiveness**
   (1) (U) **Damage Expectancy**
    (a)  

D-19

Enclosure D
(b) (c)

(c) (d)

(d) (e)

(2) (f)

(3) (g)

(4) (U) USSTRATCOM, DIA, and DNA should continue to pursue and evaluate measures of effectiveness methodologies that support SIOP option planning.

10. [PS] \[LIMITED ATTACK OPTIONS \ (p. vii)\]

a. [PS]
PART II. NRF AND ADAPTIVE PLANNING (U)

1. PURPOSE (p. vii)
   a. 
   b. (TS)

2. NRF STRUCTURE (p. vii)
   a. (TS)
   b. (S)

D-25

Enclosure D
Figure D-3. (U) Nuclear Reserve Force

3. (U) SRF Planning and Sizing.
   a. (TS)

   (1) (TS)
      (a) (TS)
      (b) (TS)
      (c) (TS)

   (b) (U)
4. (U) **Adaptive Planning.** Adaptive planning will be a principal means of Reserve force employment. It can occur in the pre-, trans-, or post-MAO timeframe and involve either SIOP/NSNF or Reserve forces.

a. 

b.
c. [U] Employment Guidelines
   (1) [TS]
   (2) [TS]
      (a) [TS]
      (b) [TS]
   (3) [TS]

d. [TS]
   (1) [TS]

Enclosure D
ENCLOSURE E
THEATER NUCLEAR PLANNING [U]

1. (S) Scope and Applicability (p. 18)

2. (U) General
   a. (S)
   b. (S)
   c. (S)

(1) [U] Assist combatant CINCs in developing the appropriate appendix to their operation plans.

Classified by: LTG Wesley K. Clark, DJ-5
Reason: 1.5(a)
Declassify on: X-4

E-1

Enclosure E
3. (U) **Theater Targeting Requirements**
   a. (U) Appropriate combatant CINCs will:

   (3) (U) Act as manager for USCINCEUR SAS and PAL systems.

   (4) (S)
4. (U) **Theater Nuclear Targeting Limitations.** Limitations and constraints for theater nuclear targeting are in Enclosure C, paragraph 8.

5. (U) **Theater Nuclear Option Employment**

   a. (U) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be approval authority for all weapon system and command and control aircraft requests by the supported CINC.

   b. (S) [ ] (b)(1)
(3) [U] USSTRATCOM will coordinate the planning and generation of appropriate nuclear forces with other supporting CINCs.

(1) [U] Explicit objectives.
(2) (U) Type of facility, and relation, if any, to enemy power projection capability.

(3) (U) Probability of success.

(4) (U) Alternative means to achieve the objective, if any.

(5) (S) 

(6) (U) Estimated fatalities (prompt and fallout).

(7) (U) Size of the attack.

(8) (U) Type of delivery system.

(9) (E) 

(10) (E) 

(11) (E) 

(12) (U) Probable perception of US will and resolve.

(13) (U) Likelihood and acceptability of probable enemy response on the US or its allies.

(14) (G) 

(15) (U) Adequacy of attack as a demonstration of US capability.

(16) (U) Relationship to other US military presence.

(17) (U) Relationship to US vital interests, treaty commitments, diplomatic agreements, and denial and escalation implications.

f. (G) 

g. (G) 

h. (G) 

i. (G) 

E-5

Enclosure E
6. (U) **Nuclear Appendices to OPLANs**
   
a. (U) When required, nuclear appendices to OPLANs will be developed in the format and contain the information required by JOPES Volumes I and II. Additionally, these appendices will include the following:

   (1) (S)

   (2) (S)

   (3) (S)

   (4) (S)

   (5) (S)

   (6) (S)

b. (U) Combatant CINCs will submit appendices to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval during plan review and to USSTRATCOM for information.

7. (U) **Crisis Management.** Combatant CINCs and USCINCSTRAT will maintain the capability to plan and execute theater nuclear options for generated nuclear forces on short notice during crisis and emergency situations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USCINCSTRAT, and CINCs having nuclear requirements will develop crisis management and nuclear employment planning tools and procedures to ensure responsive option development and interaction among NCA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant CINCs, and appropriate intelligence agencies.

8. (U) **Adaptive Planning Procedure**
   
a. (S)
ENCLOSURE F

RECONNAISSANCE IN SUPPORT OF NUCLEAR OPERATIONS(U)

1. (S) [PURPOSE + SCOPE (p. viii)]

2. (S) [RECONNAISSANCE OBJECTIVES (p. viii)]

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3. (S) [Applicability (p. viii)]

a. (S) [ ]

Classified by: LTG Wesley K. Clark, DJ-5
Reason: 1.5(a)
Declassify on: X-4

SECRET
a. (U) General Priorities. The intelligence collection requirement categories are prioritized as follows:

(1) (S)
(2) (S)
(3) (S)

4. (S) RECONNAISSANCE PRIORITIES (p. viii)

F-2

Enclosure F
(a) (U) Assume SIOP forces are fully generated.
(b) (S)
(c) (S)
(d) (S)
(e) (S)
(f) (U) Coordinate reconnaissance missions requiring defense suppression with the Joint Staff.
(g) (S)

Enclosure F
g. (U) Reporting

(1) (U) All reconnaissance plans supporting nuclear options will include specific reference to the procedures for reporting reconnaissance information, including advisory support and any significant events or encounters.

(2) (S) Reporting

(3) (S) Reporting

(4) (S) Reporting
ENCLOSURE G

SIOP AND NRF REVIEW, APPROVAL, AND ANALYSIS (U)

1. (U) **Scope and Applicability.** This section contains procedures for maintaining the SIOP and NRF: reviewing option development; approving revisions; and analyzing various aspects of the SIOP and NRF.

2. (S) [GENERAL (p. viii)]

3. (U) **SIOP and NRF Revision.** Any revision to the SIOP or NRF will be categorized as a new plan and uniquely identified by attaching the last two digits of the calendar year (e.g., SIOP-96 represents a new plan implemented during calendar year 1996). If more than one new plan is required during a calendar year, it will be identified by sequentially attaching a letter to the year (e.g., SIOP-96A).

   a. (U) **Plan Revision.**

   (1) (S) [98-53h

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   (2) (S)

   b. (S)

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Reason: 1.5(a)
Declassify on: X-4

G-1

Enclosure G
4. (S)
   a. (S)

(1) (S)

(2) (U) SIOP and NRF Revision Report
   (a) (C)

Enclosure G
(b)(1)

1. (S)

2. (S)

3. (S)

4. (S)

a. (S)

b. (S)

c. (S)

5. (S)

6. (U) Other topics as desired or requested.

G-3

Enclosure G
(b) (U) Use the following assumptions in preparing the Revision Report:

1. (S)

2. (S)

(c) (S)

1. (S)

2. (S)

3. (S)

4. (S)

b. (U) Other Briefing/Reporting Requirements. USSTRATCOM will provide applicable briefings and/or reports to those supported or supporting CINCs et al as requested or when changes of command occur.

5. (U) SIOP Analysis The SIOP will be analyzed in three phases.

a. (U) Phase I: Consequences of Execution Analysis. USSTRATCOM will accomplish a monthly consequences of execution analysis to help assess SIOP effectiveness. In addition, USSTRATCOM will conduct similar analysis before submitting a new plan or major plan revision for approval. The analysis will be performed and reported for each MAO and LAQ based on the employment of SIOP-committed weapons. SIOP planning factors will be used for all planning assumptions. This analysis will be presented as part of the Revision Report.

b. (U) Phase II: War Game Analysis. USSTRATCOM will conduct a war game analysis on an annual basis, or as soon as possible after a revision, to assess the SIOP's capability to comply with current guidance. Such
analysis will include the potential contribution of SACEUR's MCOs and encompass various scenarios to include prolonged exchange. Because of the uncertainties in installation configuration, population distribution, compound nuclear effects, and other considerations, the values resulting from such analyses should be presented as relative measures of the probable results rather than as absolute or exact predictions. To support war game activities and feedback:

(1) (U) USSTRATCOM will brief war game results to the Joint Staff and others as requested.

(2) (U) USSTRATCOM and J-8 will exchange (in accordance with Joint Staff directives) RISOP and SIOP products and other such planning information as needed.

(3) (U) J-8 will analyze and validate the war game data and perform other analyses as required.

(4) (U) J-3 (with J-5 and J-8 coordination) will provide USSTRATCOM with baseline wargaming planning timelines.

(5) (U) USSTRATCOM and J-8, based on their war game analysis, will make recommendations for improving guidance, data bases, planning factors, guidelines to C3 operations, SIOP and MCO coordination, etc.

(6) (U) USSTRATCOM and J-8 will solicit recommendations for special wargaming topics.

c. (U) Phase III: Intelligence Assessment Analysis. DIA will conduct intelligence assessment analysis at the request of the Director, Joint Staff, using SIOP data provided by USSTRATCOM.
ENCLOSURE H
RESPONSIBILITIES (U)

1. (U) **Purpose.** This section assigns responsibilities for various tasks.

2. (U) **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will:
   a. (U) In coordination with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
      1. (S)
      2. (S)
      3. (S)
      4. (S)
   b. (S)
   c. (S)
   d. (S)
   e. (S)
   f. (S)

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Reason: 1.5(a)
Declassify on: X-4

H-1
Enclosure H
g. (U) Review and approve nuclear weapon employment plans (including the SIOP), associated target lists, and supporting reconnaissance planning.

h. (U) Review and approve prelaunch survivability factors, as well as weapon system reliability and accuracy factors.

i. (U) Establish and maintain the necessary procedures for the preparation of plans called for by this guidance.

j. (U) Establish and maintain EAPs in support of this guidance. Review EAPs evolving from EAP-CJCS directives.

k. (U) Establish and maintain procedures necessary to provide for a high degree of interaction with the NCA during the course of a crisis, to include providing appropriate information concerning available options and predicted outcomes; the status of US forces; the intelligence obtained from US and allied reconnaissance missions; and the results of US, allied, and enemy nuclear strikes.

l. (U) Review the results of SIOP war games conducted by USSTRATCOM.

m. (U) Ensure coordination of national and command plans for reconnaissance and intelligence support of nuclear operations. Identify supporting commands to fulfill reconnaissance requirements determined during theater nuclear plan review or identified by the affected combatant CINC to be beyond the capability of command assets.

n. (U) Advise the President and the Secretary of Defense, as required, of actions taken to carry out the policy guidance in this supplement.

o. (U) Provide to the Secretary of Defense periodic evaluations of the risk, limitations, and effectiveness of nuclear weapon employment plans and supporting reconnaissance planning.

p. (U) Submit requests for exceptions to established policy, as required, to the Secretary of Defense. In this regard, whenever military objectives are constrained and military effectiveness is degraded, identify the problem to the Secretary of Defense and prepare appropriate solutions.

q. (U) Perform operational oversight of NPES management. Conduct independent validation and verification of NPES and derivative software.

r. (S) [ ]

3. COMBATANT CINC's (P-VIII) [ ]

a. (S) [ ]

H-2 Enclosure H
1. (a) Maintain capability or methodology to adaptively plan TNOs and DPOS, as required, to meet contingencies.

2. (b) Submit appropriate data for committed reconnaissance assets in the form of source data inputs to USSF/RADCOM for inclusion in nuclear reconnaissance documentation.
l. (S)  

m. (S)  

n. (U) Develop intelligence collection requirements for TNOs.

o. (S)  

p. (U) Develop reconnaissance appendixes to support command-developed nuclear appendixes to OPLANs and CONPLANs.

q. (U) If directed, provide reconnaissance support for theater nuclear plans approved for execution within their AOR but developed by another CINC.

r. (U) Advise other commands of support requirements for operations in their AOR.

s. (U) Review intelligence agency plans that support combatant command nuclear operation plans.

t. (U) Provide appropriate information to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the status of forces to execute options developed in accordance with guidance herein.

u. (U) Accomplish assigned taskings outlined in the SSP Production Plan.

4. (U) USCINCSTRAT. In addition to the applicable responsibilities listed in paragraph 3 above, USCINCSTRAT will:

a. (U) Develop, maintain, and publish the SIOP, preplanned SRF options, and, in coordination with the appropriate CINCs, applicable target lists.
b. (U) Coordinate nuclear employment activities, to the maximum extent practicable, with combatant CINCs and specified allied commanders.

c. (U) Analyze, assess, and provide to the appropriate CINCs the impact of theater nuclear options upon the SIOP and the extent to which they impact on SIOP objectives.

d. (U) Develop, maintain and publish guidelines and procedures for collection, evaluation, and reporting of planning factors used in SIOP development (i.e., PLS, reliability, and accuracy factors).

e. (U) Receive service inputs for SIOP planning factors and validate methodology and rationale for their development.

f. (U) Present SIOP planning factors along with supporting methodology and rationale for their development to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

g. (U) In coordination with affected CINCs and the Director, DIA, as appropriate, develop and provide programs for assessing the penetration capabilities of strategic weapon systems.

h. [ ]

i. [ ]

j. [ ]

k. [ ]

l. [ ]

(1) [ ]

(2) [ ]

(3) [ ]

(4) [ ]

(5) [ ]

(6) [ ]

(7) [ ]

(8) [ ]

(9) [ ]

(10) [ ]
r. (U) In coordination with DIA and DNA, continue to pursue and evaluate measures of effectiveness methodologies that support SiOP option planning.

s. (S)

t. (U) Conduct analysis of strike assessment coverage for the SiOP and preplanned TNOs, recommend modifications that will enhance reconnaissance coverage, and provide supporting data and documentation to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commands, as appropriate.
v. (U) With DIA, co-chair the PCC to identify and prioritize strategic nuclear targeting intelligence requirements and to coordinate and produce an annual intelligence production plan to satisfy these requirements, consistent with available resources.

w. (U) Accomplish assigned taskings outlined in the SSP Production Plan.

x. (U) Perform nuclear reconnaissance planning in support of the CINCs, including routing, tasking, and timing in support of nuclear weapon strike assessment.

y. (U) Maintain the capability to analyze and assess the probability of success of strike or reconnaissance sorties supporting nuclear options and provide each command the result of the analyses.

z. (U) Recommend changes to nuclear reconnaissance guidance to improve reconnaissance coverage.

aa. (U) Develop, maintain, and publish the NUWEP Reconnaissance List and other documentation related to strike assessment planning necessary to determine the results of US and allied nuclear strikes in support of the SIOP and preplanned TNOs.

bb. (U) Provide USSTRATCOM Decision Papers to the Joint Staff.

dd. (U) Develop and present a concept briefing to Joint Staff, OSD, Service representatives, and other interested agencies after completion of the allocation phase of SIOP and NRF option development.

H-7

Enclosure H
ff. (U) Prepare the SIOP (Basic), including annexes and appendixes, and submit it as soon as possible to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval.

gg. (U) Accomplish a consequences of execution analysis for each MAO and LAO. Present the resulting analysis as part of the Revision Report.

hh. (U) Conduct war game analysis to assess the SIOP's capability to comply with current guidance. Brief results of the analysis to the Joint Staff at the earliest opportunity following the SIOP revision effective date and others as requested.

ii. (U) Provide the NTB, strike files, evacuated data base, supporting documentation, and war games output for use in Joint Staff SIOP analysis.

jj. (U) Provide Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff SIOP and TNO data tapes in accordance with the NEREP.

kk. (S) [Redacted]

ll. (C) [Redacted]

mm. (U) During the effective period of a major SIOP revision, advise the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of any significant decrease in reported damage expectancies.

nn. (U) Perform as functional, program, and technical manager of NPES. Exercise supervision of DISA technical programs in support of NPES.

oo. (U) As the C³ Systems Engineer for NPES and successor NC²AIS, develop and maintain software associated with NPES and successor NC²AIS for theater nuclear plan development, maintenance, dissemination, and DPO planning in a crisis environment. As the designated developing agency for NPES, USSTRATCOM will ensure that these programs are supported. USSTRATCOM will provide designated users with these software packages and training materials as directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

pp. (U) Maintain copies of the TDI produced by DIA, and of applicable target lists produced by USSTRATCOM, for distribution to the combatant CINCs. Comparable BLUE data will be collected, maintained, produced, and distributed on request to authorized users.
q. (U) Forward **monthly maintenance action reports** to the Joint Staff.  
(J-38)

5. (S) **SUPPORTING CINC'S (p. viii)**
   a.
   b. (S)

   (1) (U) In coordination with the Joint Staff and ACE, develop, publish and maintain EAPs applicable to all EUCOM theater nuclear delivery platforms and command and control systems.

   (2) (S)

   (3) (U) Act as manager for USCINCEUR SAS and PAL systems.

   (4) (S)

6. (U) **Director, DIA**. DIA will:
   a. (S)
   b. (S)
   c. (U) With USSTRATCOM, co-chair the PCC to identify and prioritize strategic nuclear targeting intelligence requirements and to coordinate and produce an annual intelligence production plan to satisfy these requirements, consistent with available resources.
   d. (U) Accomplish assigned taskings outlined in the SSP Production Plan.

H-9

Enclosure H
e. (U) Establish goals for the enhancement of the data base to meet the dictates of the SSP and document the programs for achieving those goals.

f. (U) Effect necessary technical and substantive changes to the target intelligence programs and target materials. Coordinate such changes, through established SSP and MTIMS procedures, with commands and organizations charged with planning or conducting nuclear combat operations and with other organizations as appropriate. Ensure that the process for effecting target intelligence changes is responsive to the dictates of national policy and is documented in appropriate publications. Target intelligence and target materials issues impacting on the nuclear planning process will be staffed through established SSP and MTIC procedures. Those issues that remain unresolved will be presented to the Director, DIA, for final determination. Further recourse on unresolved issues can be made through Joint Staff channels.

g. (S) [ ]

h. (U) Provide staff intelligence support for rapid development, assessment, and execution of TNOs.

i. (U) Review intelligence annexes and supporting target and reconnaissance lists of operation plans prepared by the combatant commands.

j. (U) Provide staff intelligence support for employment planning of the NRF following acquisition of poststrike information.

k. (U) In collaboration with the appropriate commands, develop, publish, and maintain the NNICP, which includes NCA EELs.

l. (S) [ ]

m. (S) [ ]

n. (S) [ ]

o. (U) In coordination with USSTRATCOM and DNA, continue to pursue and evaluate measures of effectiveness that support SIOP option planning.
p. (U) Annually update the Red Strategic Target Data Base (RSTDB) and provide weapon characteristics and targeting strategies.

7. (U) Director, NSA. NSA will:
   a. (E)
   b. (S)
   c. (S)
   d. (C)
   e. (S)
   f. (S)
   g. (U) Accomplish assigned taskings outlined in the SSP Production Plan.

8. (U) Director, DISA. DISA will:
   a. (U) As the Nuclear C³ Systems Engineer, provide technical advice, assistance, and analysis to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services, CINC's, and Defense agencies on matters pertaining to nuclear C³ planning, assessment (including communication system reliability planning factors), system engineering, test and evaluation, and other support for nuclear decision-making and execution of war plans (including termination) throughout the entire spectrum of nuclear conflict.
   b. (U) Accomplish assigned taskings outlined in the SSP Production Plan.
   c. (U) Provide population data as follows:
      (1) (U) Population data on cities in countries not included in the SIOP or in SRF options with populations exceeding 25,000.
      (2) (U) Rural cell data on populated areas in countries not included in the SIOP or in SRF options.
(3) (c)[

NOTE: (U) The database for these countries will be improved and maintained as accurately as resources permit.

d. (U) In conjunction with DIA, provide counter C\(^3\) warhead and HAB allocation and electronic warfare threat prediction to the Director, J-8, for use in RISOP development.

9. (U) Director, DMA. DMA will:

a. (S)[

b. (U) Accomplish assigned taskings outlined in the SSP Production Plan.

10. (U) Director, DNA. DNA will provide advice and assistance, as required, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services, CINCs, and Defense agencies on the following matters concerning nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons employment planning:

a. (U) Nuclear weapon effects on weapon systems and forces.

b. (U) Analysis, as required, of nuclear weapons planning and employment options.

c. (U) Technical analysis, studies, research, and development of software to improve the application, employment, and effectiveness of nuclear weapons and weapon systems.

d. (U) Nuclear weapon survivability and security.

e. (U) Emergency support to DOD components and other Federal agencies in response to a nuclear accident.

f. (U) Radiological defense activities.

g. (U) The effects of technology on nuclear force structure, operations, and politico-military constraints.
h. (U) Provide nuclear effects models and data, hardening technology, test support, and system survivability assessments for use by the Nuclear C^3 Systems Engineer.

i. (U) In coordination with USSTRATCOM, continue to pursue and evaluate measures of effectiveness that support SIOP option planning.

j. (U) Accomplish assigned taskings outlined in the SSP Production Plan.
# Glossary (U)

## PART 1--ABBREVIATIONS (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>attack assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>antiballistic missile</td>
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<td>ACE</td>
<td>Allied Command Europe</td>
</tr>
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<td>A-Hour</td>
<td>Alert-Hour</td>
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<td>ALD</td>
<td>accounting line designator</td>
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<td>ANPP</td>
<td>ACE Nuclear Planning Process</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<td>ACE Strike File</td>
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<td>ASRP</td>
<td>Airborne SIOP Reconnaissance Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>Basic Encyclopedia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C²</td>
<td>command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C³</td>
<td>command, control, and communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C⁴I</td>
<td>command, control, communications, and intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C⁴I</td>
<td>command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence</td>
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<td>CCG</td>
<td>Crisis Coordination Group</td>
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<td>Contingency Collection Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDE</td>
<td>compound damage expectancy</td>
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<td>circular error probable</td>
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<td>CINC s</td>
<td>commanders of unified commands</td>
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<td>Composite Launch Sequence File</td>
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<td>CINC Mobile Alternate Headquarters</td>
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<td>dual-capable aircraft</td>
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<td>damage expectancy</td>
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*Abbreviations in Part I are UNCLASSIFIED: Part II contains classified information.*
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEFCON</td>
<td>defense readiness condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGZ</td>
<td>desired ground zero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIAM</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISA</td>
<td>Defense Information Systems Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMA</td>
<td>Defense Mapping Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>Defense Nuclear Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPC</td>
<td>Defense Planning Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>Directed Planning Option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>delayed response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTD</td>
<td>day-to-day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUG Attack</td>
<td>Deep Underground Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAP-CJCS</td>
<td>Emergency Action Procedures of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEI</td>
<td>essential elements of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELINT</td>
<td>electronic intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>Electromagnetic Pulse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERT</td>
<td>execution reference time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESI</td>
<td>extremely sensitive information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSU</td>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCCS</td>
<td>Global Command and Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCI</td>
<td>ground controlled intercept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>generated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIPS</td>
<td>Geographic Installation Intelligence Production Specifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRU</td>
<td>Russian Military Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAB</td>
<td>high-altitude bursts</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOB</td>
<td>height of burst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human-resource intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Integrated Data Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>intermediate range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-3</td>
<td>Operations Directorate, Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-5</td>
<td>Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-6</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate, Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-8</td>
<td>Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCC</td>
<td>Joint Coordination Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KGB</td>
<td>Committee for State Security (Russian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAO</td>
<td>Limited Attack Option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCF</td>
<td>launch control facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LF</td>
<td>launch facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR</td>
<td>long range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>long-range aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAO</td>
<td>Major Attack Option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCO</td>
<td>Major Contingency Option</td>
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<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>Military District (Russian)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIIDS</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Integrated Data System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Major NATO Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>Major Nuclear Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOB</td>
<td>main operating base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOC</td>
<td>Ministry of Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>major regional contingency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTIMS</td>
<td>Military Target Intelligence Management Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MVD</td>
<td>Ministry for Internal Affairs (Russian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAOC</td>
<td>National Airborne Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCP</td>
<td>Nuclear Command Control Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDL</td>
<td>National DGZ List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEREP</td>
<td>Nuclear Execution Reporting Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIS</td>
<td>Newly Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISP</td>
<td>Nuclear Weapons Intelligence Support Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM</td>
<td>nautical mile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNICP</td>
<td>National Nuclear Intelligence Collection Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOG</td>
<td>Nuclear Operations Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPES</td>
<td>Nuclear Planning and Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>Nuclear Planning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF</td>
<td>Nuclear Reserve Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRL</td>
<td>NUWEP Reconnaissance List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA/CSS</td>
<td>National Security Agency/Central Security Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSNF</td>
<td>nonstrategic nuclear forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSL</td>
<td>National Strategic Target List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTB</td>
<td>National Target Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUWEP</td>
<td>Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan in complete format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-95</td>
<td>population circles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>probability of arrival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>population at risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>SSP Coordinating Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>probability of damage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PLC  Positive Launch Control  
PLS  prelaunch survivability  
POL  petroleum, oils, and lubricants  
PRC  People's Republic of China  
PRL  prompt retaliatory launch  
PTP  probability to penetrate  

RB  reentry body  
RTIL  Reserve Force Target List  
RISNO  Reconnaissance In Support of Nuclear Operations  
RISOP  Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan  
RRF  reconnaissance reserve force  
RV  reentry vehicle  

SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander Europe  
SACLANT  Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic  
SAM  surface-to-air missile  
SCO  Selective Contingency Option  
SHAPE  Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe  
SIGINT  signals intelligence  
SIOP  Single Integrated Operational Plan  
SLBM  submarine-launched ballistic missile  
SNU  Selective Nuclear Use  
SRF  Secure Reserve Force  
SRT  strategic relocatable target  
SSBN  fleet ballistic missile submarine, nuclear-powered  
SSGN  cruise missile attack submarine, nuclear powered  
SSN  attack submarine, nuclear powered  
SSP  SIOP Support Plan  
STAVKA  executive organ of the VGK  
STRATLAT  USSTRATCOM Liaison Assistance Team  

TDD  target DGZ designator  
TDI  Target Data Inventory  
TI  Target Island  
TIPP  Target Intelligence Production Plan  
TLAM/N  TOMAHAWK Land Attack Missile-Nuclear  
TNO  theater nuclear option  
TNPD  Theater Nuclear Planning Document  
TVD  Theater of Military Operation (Russian)  
TW/AA  tactical warning/attack assessment  

UNAAN  Unified Action Armed Forces  
USACOM  US Atlantic Command  
USARCENT  Commander in Chief, US Central Command  
USACEUR  Commander in Chief, US European Command  
USCINCPAC  Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command  
USCINCSRT  Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command  
USSTRATCOM  US Strategic Command  
UTC  Urgent Targeting Change
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VGK</td>
<td>Supreme High Command (CIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNTK</td>
<td>vulnerability number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAC</td>
<td>World Area Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSI</td>
<td>war supporting industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSR</td>
<td>weapon system reliability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWMCCS</td>
<td>Worldwide Military Command and Control System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GLOSSARY (U)

PART II--definitions *(U)

a. *(S)

* Definitions are applicable only in the context of this document. Definitions in this section either do not appear in Joint Pub 1-02 or were expanded for specific application to the Nuclear Supplement to the JSCP. A further compilation of CJCS-approved definitions pertaining to the SIOP is included in the SIOP (Basic).
b. (S) [ ]

c. (S) [ ]

d. (S) [ ]

(U) **Allocated (nuclear).** The apportionment of specific numbers and types of nuclear weapons to a commander for a stated time period as a planning factor for use in the development of war plans. (Additional authority is required for the actual deployment of allocated weapons to locations desired by the commander to support the war plans. Expenditures of these weapons are not authorized until released by proper authority.) Joint Pub 1-02.

(U) **Collateral Damage.** Damage inflicted on installations not targeted in the executed option or not objective to the DGZ being evaluated for damage.

(U) **Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).** An association comprising the former Soviet Republics (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan) that has taken over many functions formerly exercised under Soviet national-level political and military control (i.e., Soviet NCA, MOD, and General Staff). The Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are not members of the CIS.

(U) **Consequences of Execution (C of E).** An evaluation which examines attack options and planning assumptions against a range of most representative values of approved planning factors and technical parameters (e.g., pre-launch survivability, weapon system reliability, weapon yield, and VNTKs) and that estimates damage expectancies and expected fatalities for all preplanned SIOP attack options.

(U) **Constraint.** A targeting limitation in which certain target categories are prohibited from attack for reasons of National policy.
(9) Layering of Weapons: The layering of weapons from different delivery platforms to increase the probability of weapon arrival and the confidence in damaging the target to the specified level.

(a) Cross-Targeting. The layering of weapons from different delivery platforms to increase the probability of weapon arrival and the confidence in damaging the target to the specified level.

(b) Layering. The layering of weapons from different delivery platforms to increase the probability of weapon arrival and the confidence in damaging the target to the specified level.
(U) Desired Ground Zero (DGZ). A point on the earth's surface below, at, or above which the detonation of a nuclear weapon is planned. DGZ may be expressed in either geographic or geodetic coordinates.

(U) Disablement. The act of rendering a nuclear weapon incapable of achieving a nuclear yield by destroying critical components so that factory rebuild or depot-level repair is required to permit the weapon to function in its intended mode.

(U) Dispersal Site. An area or installation used by forces during periods of alert, mobilization, or armed conflict to reduce vulnerability to detection and/or attack.

(U) Dose Index. The total expected dose for the unprotected population at a selected monitor point, adjusted for wind and radiation correlation among target areas.

(U) Effective Protection Factor. A value assigned to the fallout protection realized by a population through the use of available shelters. It is a function of shelter radiation transmission factors, distribution of population among the shelters, and time spent inside them.

(U) Energy Network. That segment of a nation's industrial base (including production and distribution) that provides energy in the form of electricity, petroleum, and natural gas required to support the rest of the industrial-economic base, military operations, and the general population.
(U) **Escalation Control.** The concept of limiting the level, scope, duration or intensity of a conflict with the objective of terminating the crisis/war at the lowest level of conflict possible and on terms favorable to the United States.

(U) **Expected Dose.** The predicted unprotected radiation dose at a selected monitor point resulting from a specified nuclear detonation.

(U) **Fatalities.** Deaths produced by the short-term effects of nuclear detonations.

(U) **Generated (GEN).** A force readiness condition which assumes the generation of all missiles, SSBNs and aircraft to alert status.

(U) **Geographic Installation Intelligence Production Specifications (GIPS).** Comprehensive documentation of all production specifications for the various programs in the MIIDS IDB, including the TDI and the CPFL.

(U) **High-Altitude Bursts (HAB).** The explosion of a nuclear weapon which takes place at a height in excess of 100,000 feet (30,000 meters), having the objective of disrupting electronic circuits through exposure to the disruptive effects of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Both objective and non-objective installations may be exposed to the generated EMP field because of the large area coverage associated with HABs. The release of HAB weapons will be determined solely by the objective of the attack option since there is no blast or debris damage associated with this tactic.

(U) **Integrated Data Base (IDB).** The core automated data base of the MIIDS. It describes units, personnel, equipment, facilities, and installations in accordance with Joint Pub 1-02 definitions. The information in the IDB is integrated in a manner to facilitate analytical manipulation of information to assess the military capabilities and vulnerabilities of countries worldwide (except the United States and Canada).
Layering. The application of two or more weapons to a single target to improve the confidence that a weapon will arrive and/or the desired damage level will be achieved.

Maximum Allowable Dose Index. The maximum allowed unprotected dose, at any selected monitor point, for a defined set of population risk criteria (risk level, risk dose, and population exposure level).
(U) **Monitor Point.** A selected geographic point for which the expected dose is evaluated.

(U) **National Command Authorities.** Consist only of The President and the Secretary of Defense, their successors or duly deputized alternate. The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the
commanders of the unified commands. The channel of communication for execution of the S3OP and other time-sensitive operations is from the President through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the executing commanders.

(U) National-Level Military Controls. The command elements, associated staffs, command post facilities, and supporting communications (in the hierarchically structured military C3 systems) responsible for preparing and maintaining a military force structure for war, as well as planning and executing combat operations with that force.

(U) National-Level Political Controls. Under the direction of the Russian NCA, national-level political controls are organizations located primarily in the region of the capital in peacetime administrative headquarters and wartime facilities. Part of the national-level wartime management system, national-level political controls consist of decision making organizations and personnel responsible for planning and managing political organs, military forces, and economic resources that sustain the affairs of government and the nation in peace or war. These organizations include the President, Security Council, Supreme Soviet, Cabinet of Ministers, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), selected state committees and commissions, and the communications and other facilities that support national-level fixed and mobile command posts.

(U) Newly Independent States (NIS). A term describing the former Soviet Union Republics.
(U) Non-strategic Nuclear Forces (NSNF). Those nuclear-capable forces located in an area of military operations with a capability to employ nuclear weapons by land, sea, or air forces against opposing forces, supporting installations, or facilities. Such forces may be employed, when authorized by competent authority, to support operations that contribute to the accomplishment of the commander's mission within the theater of operations. The categorizations of NSNFs include: (1) Dual-capable aircraft--Land-based nuclear-capable aircraft with less than intercontinental combat range; and (2) TLAM/N--Sea-based nuclear system with less than intercontinental range that is used to strike targets ashore.

(U) P-95 Circle. A circle encompassing 95 percent of the nighttime population of a city or urban area. Specific criteria, including maximal and minimal limits for the size of the P-95 circle and the minimal population to be included in the circle, are prescribed in DIA's Geographic Installation Intelligence Production Specification (GIPS) documents. For computational purposes, the distribution of the population within the circle is assumed to be circular normal. Used in Consequences of Execution (C of E) analysis.
(U) **Pre-launch Survivability.** The probability that a delivery vehicle will survive an enemy attack and be available for execution. The following factors are used in association with PLS:

a. (S) 

b. (S) 

(U) **Probability of Arrival (PA).** The probability that the weapon will successfully arrive and detonate in the target area as planned. PA is typically broken down into components, including PLS, WSR, and PIP.

(U) **Probability of Damage (PD).** The probability that an arriving weapon with a given yield, circular error probable (CEP), height of burst (HOB), and displacement from a target or set of targets will achieve at least the specified degree of damage to the target. The target is characterized by type, size, and vulnerability to weapon effects.

(U) **Prompt Nuclear Effects.** Blast, thermal effects, and initial nuclear radiation resulting from a nuclear detonation that causes personnel casualties and fatalities and material damage. Thermal and radiation effects, though present, are not yet considered in assessing material damage. All three effects (blast, thermal, and radiation) are used to calculate population at risk (PAR) and personnel casualties.
"In order to increase the uncertainties in the minds of Russian planners, it is not our policy to explain in detail how we would respond to a Russian missile attack. However, the United States does not rely on its capability for launch on warning or launch under attack to ensure the credibility of its deterrent. At the same time, the US ability to carry out such options complicates Russian assessments of war outcomes and enhances deterrence."

[U] Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan (RISOP). A Joint Staff-approved hypothetical Russian strategic war plan whose primary purpose is to provide an evaluation tool for testing SIOP effectiveness through computer simulation.

(U) **Risk Dose.** The radiation dose deemed acceptable by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(U) **Rural Cell Data.** Population estimates for areas geographically divided into rectangles circumscribed by a specified number of minutes of longitude and latitude. For computational purposes, the distribution of the population within these cells is assumed to be uniform.

(U) **SIOP Support Program (SSP).** Program responsible for unifying and enhancing a wide variety of DOD intelligence support activities associated with
US strategic nuclear targeting, and for consolidating and prioritizing intelligence support requirements to the SIOP. The SSP Coordinating Committee, composed of representatives from DIA, the Joint Staff, OSD, and USSTRATCOM, serves as the focal point for program activities.

(U) **SSP Production Plan.** The annual intelligence support requirements statement which documents, in priority order, all known SIOP-related support requirements. Plan provides a prioritized listing of intelligence support activities that can be supported by available resources and a prioritized listing of requirements that cannot be implemented in the production plan due to resource shortfalls. The Director, Joint Staff, in coordination with ASD(ISP) and ASD(C4I), will review and approve the plan.

(U) **Strategic Nuclear Forces.** Weapon systems (ICBM, SLBM, and aircraft) that possess intercontinental range (greater than 5,500 km) and are capable of striking one or more enemy targets to satisfy US nuclear employment objectives.

(U) **Strategic Relocatable Target.** A mobile or movable strategic nuclear weapon or function that does not have a static wartime location. Strategic relocatable targets may move while performing their intended function, or as doctrine and conditions dictate.

(U) **Strategic Warning.** Notification that enemy-initiated hostilities may be imminent. This notification may be received any time prior to the initiation of hostilities.

(U) **Supreme High Command.** A select group of national-level military decision makers in Russia, including the Supreme Commander in Chief, Minister of Defense, Chief of the General Staff, First Deputy Ministers of Defense, and Commanders in Chief of Russian Services. This NCA component is responsible for directing and managing the wartime military strategy and operations of Russian Armed Forces.

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Glossary
(U) **Tactical Warning.** Notification the enemy has initiated hostilities. Such warning may be received at any time, ranging from initial launch indications to weapon detonation.

(U) **Target Intelligence Production Plan (TIPP).** An annually updated, long-term DIA research and production plan designed to identify, document, and solve critical intelligence gaps in US targeting strategy.

(U) **Target Island.** A geographic area encompassing one or more installations.

(U) **Target Materials.** Target intelligence presented in graphic, textual, tabular, digital, video, microfilm, or other format suitable for training, planning, executing, and evaluating military operations.
(U) **War-Supporting Industry.** Elements of the enemy's industrial structure whose destruction would have the most severe effect on the enemy's capability to sustain major military operations or exercise power in the immediate post-war period.